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IT'S "INSTANT CUSTOM": HOW THE 
BUSH DOCTRINE BECAME lAW 
AFTER THE TERRORIST ATIACKS 
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
BENJAMIN LANGILLE* 
Abstract: Historically, courts have recognized a customary international 
law only upon finding evidence of uniform state practice over a 
protracted period of time. In today's rapidly evolving global society, 
however, "instant custom" theorists contend that new customary 
international laws may form in much less time than the decades upon 
decades of consistent practice traditionally required. This Note 
considers the instant custom theory and argues that the Bush Doctrine 
became a new customary international law in the immediate aftermath 
ofthe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hours after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush 
announced that, in bringing to justice those responsible, "we will 
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts 
and those who harbor them. "1 While on the one hand, Bush's state-
ment simply embodied America's resolve to seek retribution for the 
heinous acts, on the other hand, the statement introduced into inter-
national relations a novel approach toward fighting terrorism, setting 
in motion a series of events that culminated in the rapid formation of 
a new customary internationallaw.2 
* Benjamin Langille is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 U.S. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Na-
tion (September 11, 2001), at http:/ /www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=5044 [herein-
after Statement by the President]. 
2 See id.; ANTHONY A. D'AMAro, CoNCEPT oF CusroM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 88 
(1971 ). 
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On September 12, 2001, one day after the initial proclamation of 
what has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine,3 the members of 
the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly and Security Council 
passed resolutions reinforcing the doctrine.4 Soon thereafter, through 
acts and statements, countless states worldwide expressed fervent 
support for the Bush Doctrine and, more generally, the war against 
terrorism. 5 
In today's rapidly growing and changing world community, states 
have accepted the need to adapt the method by which customary in-
ternational law is made.6 This Note reviews the traditional method of 
customary international law formation and proposes that acceptance 
of the notion of "instant custom" as a method of forming customary 
international law is a necessary step in keeping pace with the rapidly 
evolving international community. 
Part I-A reviews the traditional method of forming customary in-
ternational law. Part I-B discusses legal scholar Anthony D'Amato's 
reformulated theory of customary international law. Part II explores 
the evolution of the notion of instant custom. Part III proposes that 
D'Amato's reformulated customary international law theory best sup-
ports the notion of instant custom. Part IV reviews the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, and lastly, Part V contends that a new custom-
ary international law formed immediately following the attacks. In 
short, this Note argues that the Bush Doctrine became customary in-
ternational law through the method of instant custom during the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States. 
3 The Bush Doctrine is the assertion that nations harboring terrorists are as guilty as 
the terrorists themselves. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Chides Some Members of Coalition for Inac-
tion in War Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at B4. 
4 G.A. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/L.1 (2001); U.N. SCOR, 4370th 
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001). 
5 See White House Web Site, West Wing, America Responds, September 2001, at 
http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/resources.htrnl (last visited Nov. 29, 
2001). 
6 Louis B. Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WAsH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 
(1986). 
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I. CusTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 
A. Traditional Customary International Law 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) defines custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law. "7 According to legal scholar Anthony D'Amato: "The importance 
of custom is rooted in the desire of the international community for 
order and security-aims which are indistinguishable from the mean-
ing of 'law.'"8 
Traditional writings maintain that customary international law 
consists of two elements: (1) usage, states' practice, and (2) opinio juris, 
a sense of legal obligation.9 Courts traditionally have ascertained cus-
tom by engaging in a detailed historical analysis of many centuries of 
state practice, recognizing a customary international law when it 
reflects both a state's uniform practice over a long period of time and 
that state's conscious acceptance of the principle as law.10 Historically, 
the period of time required has been rather extensive, with new cus-
tomary rules developing slowly, often over many decades.11 
B. D'Amato's &formulated Theory of Customary International Law 
D'Amato criticizes traditional writings on customary interna-
tional law, which he claims, "overcomplicate the matter."12 D'Amato 
contends that the notion of opinio juris leads many writers into arcane 
inquiries regarding the motivations of states, as if states, as artificial 
entities, could have discernible motivations.13 Furthermore, D'Amato 
argues that the concept of usage seems to require an undefinable 
number of repetitions before a line of conduct can be said to gener-
ate legal obligation.H 
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1995, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060, T.S. No. 993, available at http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ 
ibasicstatute.htm. 
8 D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 270. 
9 Katherine N. Guernsey, Comment, The North Continental Shelf Cases, 27 Oum N.U. L. 
REv. 141, 143 (2000). 
10 Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determin-
ing Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DuKE LJ. 876, 877 (1983). 
11 See Guernsey, supra note 9, at 143. 
12 See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 271. 
Ufd. 
14 Id. 
148 Boston College Int~m~,ational & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:145 
D'Amato simplifies the traditional theory of customary interna-
tional law by reformulating the elements of opinio juris and usage into 
simpler elements, "articulation" and "act."15 According to D'Amato's 
theory, when a rule is alleged to be a customary international law, the 
person asserting the rule must adduce both an articulation of the rule 
and an act, or commitment to act, consistent with the articulation}6 
Many contradictory rules may be articulated, but a state can only act 
in one way at one timeP The act must be visible, real, and significant, 
thus crystallizing policy and demonstrating which of the numerous, 
and often contradictory, articulated rules the acting state has decided 
to manifest. 18 Once the act occurs, the previously articulated rule 
takes on life as a rule of customary internationallaw}9 
At the very least, the party asserting the existence of a customary 
international law must cite one instance of an act following the articu-
lation, though there may be a significant difference in the threshold 
of persuasiveness if two or more acts can be cited.20 While D'Amato's 
claim-oriented approach gives more persuasive weight to the repeti-
tion of the act, it does not engage in "mystical jumps from non-law to 
law according to the number of repetitions. "21 
In most cases, a state's action is easily recognized: sending up a 
satellite, testing nuclear weapons, receiving ambassadors, levying cus-
toms duties, and capturing a pirate's vessel.22 Since the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf Cases, however, scholars have asserted that, in addition to 
its actions, a state's statements should serve as confirmation of the 
existence of a custom.23 That is, not only is "national legislation, par-
liamentary and administrative practice, and the case-law of municipal 
tribunals" a valid source of evidence of state practice, but so are the 
statements of state representatives and their votes at diplomatic con-
ferences or in U.N. bodies.24 Indeed, in the Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the ICJ looked to 
statements made by states at diplomatic conferences for confirmation 
15 See id. 
16 !d. at 87. 
17 D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 88. 
18 See id. 
19 !d. at 88. 
20 !d. at 91. 
21 !d. at 271. 
22 D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 88. 
23 See Guernsey, supra note 9, at 154. 
24 !d. 
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of the existence of a customary internationallaw.25 In addition to fa-
cilitating the process of gathering evidence to confirm the existence 
of a customary international law, states now have a means through 
which to change the law without having to act in ways that place them 
in jeopardy ofviolating existing laws or harming other states.26 
Writing in a time before the manned exploration of outer space, 
D 'Amato offers the example of a 1963 U.N. General Assembly resolu-
tion stating that exploration and use of outer space were matters of 
international law.27 According to D'Amato, the resolution provides 
the element of articulation, which, alone, does not generate custom-
ary internationallaw.28 However, "[i]f states later behave in a manner 
consistent with the resolution when exploration and use of outer 
space become technologically feasible, we may then say that custom-
ary law has been established."29 Indeed, in his example, D'Amato rec-
ognizes that a U.N. General Assembly resolution followed by a consis-
tent act could form a new customary internationallaw.30 
II. TowARDs THE NoTION oF INsTANT CusToM 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ deviated from the 
traditional view of customary international law development, that 
rules develop over an extensive period of time and that specific evi-
dence of opinio juris must be obtained.31 Indeed, in its opinion, the 
ICJ prescribed a new course for customary international law, opening 
the door for official recognition of state practice over the short-term 
as binding custom, so long as sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate 
support for the customary internationallaw.32 Though a relatively mi-
nor point in the ICJ opinion, the justices noted that rapidly develop-
ing customary international law is desirable because it is more at-
tuned to the rate of development in the modern global society.33 The 
ICJ stated: 
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily ... a bar to the formation of a new rule of cus-
25 Id. 
2s Id. at 155. 
27 See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 78. 
28 Id. at 78-79. 
29 Id. at 79. 
80 See id. at 78-79. 
51 See Guernsey, supra note 9, at 153. 
52 Id. 
55 ld. 
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tomary international law on the basis of what was originally a 
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement 
would be that within the period in question, short though it 
might be, State practice, including that of States whose in-
terests are specially affected, should have been both exten-
sive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision in-
voked;-and should moreover have occurred in such a way 
as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved.34 
As an example of a rapidly developed customary international 
law, Judge Lachs cited the law of freedom of movement in outer 
space, already an "established and recognized" law, though the prac-
tice had occurred only for a short period of tirne.35 
Though the opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases paved 
the way, legal scholar Bin Cheng officially introduced the notion of 
instant custom.36 Cheng wrote: "As international law is a horizontal 
legal system in which states are both the law-makers and the subjects 
of the legal system, opinio juris can arise or change instantaneously. "37 
According to Cheng's instant custom theory, the usage prong of cus-
tomary international law has little or no significance.38 Not only is it 
unnecessary that the usage be prolonged, but there also need be no 
usage at all in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the opinio 
juris of the states concerned can be established clearly.39 
Thus, according to Cheng's theory, states can advance a new cus-
tomary international law, either in concert with other states or unilat-
erally, simply by evincing a new opinio juris.40 H other states do not ob-
ject, and in fact follow suit, they will share the same opinio juris, thus 
forming a new rule of customary internationallaw.41 
Cheng's instant custom theory has drawn criticism from scholars 
who insist that customary international law and "instantaneousness" 
34 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, para. 74 (Feb. 
28). 
!!1i See Guernsey, supra note 9, at 150. 
36 GJ.H.VAN HooF, RETIIINKING TilE SouRcEs oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 86 (1983). 
37 Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice In a Divided World, in THE 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY Doc-
TRINE AND THEORY 513,532 (R. StJ. Macdonald & Douglas M.Johnston eds., 1983). 
38 See VAN HooF, supra note 36, at 86. 
39 !d. 
40 Cheng, supra note 37, at 549. 
41 !d. 
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are irreconcilable concepts.42 Legal scholar GJ.H. van Hoof contends 
that customary international law as a method of law creation conveys 
the idea that rules are based on states' practice.43 According to van 
Hoof, Cheng's theory of instant custom conveys precisely the opposite 
idea, suggesting that such practice is irrelevant to customary interna-
tional law.44 Abandoning altogether the traditionally required usage 
element, Cheng's theory may be considered an extreme version of the 
notion that customary international law can form rapidly.45 
III. INSTANT CusToM THROUGH THE LENs oF D'AMATo's 
REFORMULATED CusTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 
D'Amato's reformulated customary international law theory, 
which requires an articulation coupled with an act conforming to the 
articulation, supports the notion of instant custom-that is, that cus-
tomary international law can form rapidly.46 As the ICJ indicated in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the passage of only a short period 
of time is not a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary inter-
nationallaw.47 Thus, however short the amount of time that elapses, a 
particular rule may be considered a customary international law once 
there is an articulation of the rule and a consistent act that follows. 48 
According to University of Paris Law Professor Prosper Weil, "[Instant 
custom] is no mere acceleration of the custom-formation process, but 
a veritable revolution in the theory of custom. "49 
The predominant sources of articulated rules are treaties, draft 
conventions of the International Law Commission, and resolutions of 
the U.N. General Assembly.50 The discussion in this Note will focus on 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Indeed, U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions can contribute to a determination of a particular custom-
ary international law as long as they are considered evidence, and not 
complete proof, of the principles they support. 51 Thus, as seen in the 
outer space exploration example, U.N. General Assembly resolutions 
42 See vAN HooF, supra note 36, at 86. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 See D'AMA'IU, supra note 2, at 88. 
47 North Sea Continental Shelf, 19 I.CJ. 3, para. 74. 
48 See D'AMA'IU, supra note 2, at 74. 
49 Prosper Wei!, Towards Relative Normativity in International Lawr, 77 AM.J. Int'l L. 413, 
435 (1983). 
50 D'AMA'IU, supra note 2, at 86. 
51 Kerwin, supra note 10, at 899; see Wei!, supra note 49, at 417. 
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provide the "articulation" element of a customary international law. 52 
As viewed under the traditional theory of customary international law, 
the resolutions constitute a consensus on legal norms, providing clear 
evidence of the opinio juris of states. 53 The resolutions are the socio-
logical and political expression of trends, wishes, and intentions of 
the international community.54 Therefore, though they do not consti-
tute the formal source of new customs, resolutions serve to prepare, 
and even accelerate, the formation of new customary international 
laws. 55 
The U.N. Secretariat explained that a declaration "may be con-
sidered to impart ... a strong expectation that Members of the inter-
national community will abide by it" and "in so far as the expectation 
is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom 
become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States. "56 Thus, 
to become customary international law, a resolution must be generally 
accepted as legally binding by the members of the international 
community, either at the time of its adoption or by the subsequent 
practice of a reasonable number of states.57 Subsequent practice evi-
dences a state's willingness to conform to the principles contained in 
a declaration. 58 
Through this. method, many U.N. General Assembly resolutions 
have come to constitute "generally accepted" principles of interna-
tionallaw.59 These include resolutions on human rights, relations be-
tween states, the definition of aggression, the exploration and use of 
outer space, and the protection ofthe environment.60 
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit stated that a declaration creates an expectation of adherence, 
and insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by state practice, a 
declaration may become recognized as customary internationallaw.61 
The number of instances in which the Filartiga court cited U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions as authority makes clear the court's implicit 
52 See D'AMATI>, supra note 2, at 78-79. 
55 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 449, 484 
(2000). 
54 Weil, supra note 49, at 417. 
55 See id. 
56 Sohn, supra note 6, at 1079. 
57 Id. 
5s Id. 
59 I d. at 1078. 
60 Id. 
61 630 F.2d 876, 883 ( 2d Cir. 1980). 
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holding that these resolutions constitute authoritative sources of in-
ternational law. 62 
According to the notion of instant custom, therefore, regardless 
of how little time passes after articulation, a particular rule may be 
considered customary international law once states act in accordance 
with the rule as articulated in a U.N. General Assembly resolution. 53 
IV. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,2001 
On September 11, 2001, the U.S. came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.64 The heinous suicide attacks be-
gan at New York City's World Trade Center when a single passenger 
plane, hijacked en route from Boston to Los Angeles, slammed into 
one of the twin towers at 8:45 a.m.65 Within minutes, a second plane 
struck the other tower, another dove into the Pentagon, and a fourth 
plummeted to the earth outside of Somerset, Pennsylvania. 56 
On the evening of September 11th, President George W. Bush 
addressed the nation, condemning the acts of terror and making 
plain his intent to attribute the acts to the Taliban regime.67 Bush de-
clared: 'We will make no distinction between the terrorists who com-
mitted these acts and those who harbor them. "68 The next day, Sep-
tember 12, 2001, the members of the U.N. General Assembly and 
Security Council followed Bush's lead, passing resolutions that rein-
forced the Bush Doctrine.69 The U.N. General Assembly stated: 
"[T]hose responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the per-
petrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held account-
able. "70 The Security Council adopted the same text in unanimous 
enactment of a binding resolution requiring all member states to pur-
sue terrorists and those who support them. 71 Thus, in addition to 
62 Kerwin, supra note 10, at 886. 
63 SeeD'AMAro, supra note 2, at 79; Sohn, supra note 6, at I079. 
64 Black Tuesday; Erupting on a Crisp September Morning, Terrorist Attacks Bring America to a 
Standstill-and Take an Unthinkable Human Toll, PEOPLE, Sept. 24, 200I, at 6, available at 
200I WL 25549830. 
61iJd. 
61iJd. 
67 See Statement by the President, supra note I. 
68 Id. 
69 G.A. Res. I, supra note 4; U.N. SCOR, supra note 4. 
70 G.A. Res. I, supra note 4. 
71 U.N. SCOR, supra note 4; White House Website, West Wing, Diplomatic Actions, 
available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/response/diplomaticresponse.html [hereinafter 
White House]. 
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bringing to justice Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization 
that committed the terrorist acts, the states also pledged to pursue the 
Taliban regime for harboring the terrorists in Mghanistan.72 
V. THE BusH DocTRINE-AN INsTANT CusTOM 
There is strong evidence that the Bush Doctrine, first proclaimed 
by the U.S. in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
became an instant custom during the days and weeks following the 
attacks.73 That is, the Bush Doctrine developed into a new customary 
international law once states began acting in accordance with the rule 
first articulated by Bush and then by the U.N. General Assembly and 
the Security Council. 74 
As discussed, in order to prove that a new customary interna-
tional law has formed, there must be both an articulation of the rule 
and an act consistent with the articulation.71> Bush's Address to the 
Nation, and the subsequent U.N. General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions, provided the requisite articulation of the Bush 
Doctrine.76 The resolutions attest to the member states' willingness to 
conform to the Bush Doctrine.77 Moreover, the fact that U.N. Security 
Council resolutions are legally binding provides further evidence that, 
in unanimously enacting the resolution, members of the Security 
Council intended to obligate themselves to pursue terrorists and 
those who harbor them, in conformity with the new Bush Doctrine. 78 
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that states both acted 
and committed themselves to act in accordance with the resolutions.79 
Indeed, by the end of September 2001, less than three weeks after the 
72 See Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Campaign Against Terrorism, Address Before 
the House International Relations Committee (October 24, 2001), at http://www. 
state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/index.cfm?docid=557 [hereinafter Powell]. The U.S. pro-
vided "clear and compelling proof' that the individuals who carried out the terrorist at-
tacks were part of the worldwide terrorist network of al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin 
Laden and his key lieutenants and protected by the Taliban. Suzanne Daley, NATO Says 
U.S. Has Proof Against Bin Laden Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at AI. The Taliban regime 
conquered ninety percent of Afghanistan during the 1990s. Nation Building in Afghanistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at A20. Throughout its rule, the Taliban have allowed Osama 
bin Ladin to hide out in Afghanistan. Jd. 
73 See D'AMA'IO, supra note 2, at 88. 
74 See id. 
75 Jd. 
76 See id. 
77 See Sohn, supra note 6, at 1079. 
7s See White House, supra note 71. 
79 See Powell, supra note 72. 
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passage of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council resolu-
tions, the U.S. already had obtained forty-six multilateral declarations 
of support from a long list of states, including: Great Britain, India, 
Pakistan, Russia, China, Japan, Australia, and South Korea.80 Accord-
ing to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, states came forward im-
mediately, offering finances, intelligence, law enforcement, military 
support, and humanitarian aid.81 
For example, Great Britain acted in conformity with the articula-
tion of the Bush Doctrine by taking on a leading role in military op-
erations against the Taliban.82 Likewise, Pakistan, historically an M-
ghan ally, stated its intention to "discharge its responsibilities under 
international law," announcing a policy of full support in combating 
international terrorism.83 As a result, Pakistan granted permission for 
U.S. and British bombers and cruise missiles to fly through its air-
space.84 Saudi Arabia acted in direct accordance with the Bush Doc-
trine by severing diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime, which had 
"ignored all Saudi attempts 'to persuade it to stop harboring criminals 
and terrorists.'"85 Similarly, the United Arab Emirates cut relations 
with the Taliban for continuing to harbor terrorists.86 As another ex-
ample, Liberia offered its airspace and airports in joining the global 
fight against terrorists and those who harbor them.87 Though just a 
few of many, these examples are representative of the countless states 
that have acted and committed themselves to act in accordance with 
the Bush Doctrine.8B 
Through their actions and statements, therefore, myriad states 
worldwide expressed immediate and fervent support for the Bush 
Doctrine, articulated first by President Bush on September 11, 2001, 
80 White House Website, News Releases for September 2001, at http:/ /www.white 
house.gov I news/releases/2001 /09 I. 
81 Powell, supra note 72. 
82 See D'AMATIJ, supra note 2, at 88; Blair is the "USA's Best Secretary of State," BBC 
WoRLDWIDE MoNITIJRING, Oct. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
83 Pakistan Says in Touch with Afghanistan, Not to Participate in Global Campaign, BBC 
WoRLDWIDE MoNITI>RING, Sept. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
84 Anxious Days in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A24. 
85 Saudis Criticize the Taliban and Halt Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at B5. 
86 Kingdom Cuts Ties with Taliban; Militia Harbors Terrorists Who Cause Harm to Islam and 
Tarnish the Names of Muslims, MIDDLE EAsT NEWSFILE, Sept. 26, 2001, available at LEXIS, 
News Group File. 
87 Liberia Reportedly Endorses U.S. Military Strikes Against Afghanistan, BBC WoRLDWIDE 
MoNITIJRING, Oct. 9, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Group File. 
88 See Powell, supra note 72. 
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and again by the U.N. on September 12, 2001.89 Therefore, it may be 
argued that the Bush Doctrine became instant custom during the days 
and weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
U.S.9o 
CoNcLusiON 
Instant custom, unlike traditional, slow-forming customary inter-
national law, is attuned to the rate of development in today's rapidly 
changing global society. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
demonstrate why states must be able to act swiftly and in conformity 
with international law, especially in instances where their actions are 
sure to entail extraterritorial consequences. In a world that can be 
forever altered by sudden and unexpected developments such as 
technological advances or, in the present case, suicide airplane hijack-
ings, states must be able to create new international laws that enable 
them to react and adapt to the changing reality. It is both dangerous 
and counterproductive for states' actions to be constrained by anti-
quated international laws, which, when formed, could not have con-
templated all of the world's future needs and developments. The in-
ternational community must heed this call to recognize and accept 
instant custom as a viable and necessary method of customary inter-
national law formation. 
89 See id. 
90 See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 86. 
